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Are Corporations Evil?
DOUGLAS LITOWITZ*
The last few years have seen an unprecedented wave of corporate
scandals implicating some of America's largest corporations - Enron,
WorldCom, Adelphia, ImClone, Global Crossing, Qwest, and Tyco, just
to name a few.' The particulars of each case are unique, but certain
elements remain constant: massive accounting fraud, insider trading,
influence-peddling, dubious tax avoidance schemes, outrageous perks
for insiders, and complicity by overcompensated directors. Most of the
fraudulent schemes required the willing participation of high-profile
investment banks, brokerage houses, accounting firms, and law firms.2
In the three years since the scandals broke, nearly one thousand publicly
held corporations restated their finances in order to stave off lawsuits,3
triggering a staggering seven trillion dollar devaluation in the stock mar-
kets.4 The villains of this crime wave were predominantly white males
who claimed that they were powerless to resist the structural imperatives
* Professor of Law, Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University.
1. There have been so many corporate scandals that newspapers and magazines are now
publishing charts listing the various companies and the charges leveled against them. See, e.g.,
Executives on Trial: Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B 1; The Corporate Crime
Scorecard, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, July/Aug. 2002, at 43-44. For a colorful description of the
various scandals, see ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE TROUGH 1, 232 (2003) (containing a list
of companies under the heading, "Who's Been Indicted?").
2. For example, Enron's most notorious sham transactions (entitled "Raptors") were the
joint product of Andersen Consulting, the law firms of Vinson & Elkins and Kirkland & Ellis, and
a bevy of investment banks including Merrill Lynch and Credit Suisse First Boston. See, e.g.,
PETER C. FUSARO & Ross M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 195-197 (2002)
(containing Enron's original deal sheets for the transactions); Editorial, Hold Lawyers
Accountable in Corporate Fraud Scandals, USA TODAY, Aug. 14, 2003 at AI I ("Lawyers signed
off on the controversial transactions that ended in the recent collapse of giants, such as Enron, and
cost shareholders billions"); Carrie Johnson, Surviving the Accounting Upheaval; Ernst & Young
Changing in Response to Pressures, WASH. POST, July 30, 2003, at El (explaining that all of the
'big five' accounting firms were implicated in the corporate scandals); Julie Mason, Committee
Widens its Probe: Did Enron Pressure Banks?, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 7, 2002, Bus. Sec., at 4
(discussing the role of investment banks in the Enron debacle).
3. HUFFINGTON, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that nearly 1000 earnings restatements have been
filed since 1998); Cassell Bryan-Low, Restatements Rise 22%, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2003, at C3;
Huron Consulting Group Releases 2003 Restatements Results, Bus. WIRE, July 29, 2003.
4. See, e.g., Bill Deener, Cost to Stay Public Soars for Small Companies, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 20, 2003, at DI ("About $7 trillion in market capitalization is gone," said House of
Representatives Financial Services Committee Spokesperson Peggy Peterson); see also Jon
Chesto, Scandal Fears Rock Markets, BOSTON HERALD, July 11, 2002, Fin. Sec., at 1. ("All these
corporate hucksters have managed to do what Osama bin Laden could not do," according to
Wayne Ayers, the chief economist at FleetBoston Financial Corp.).
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of the corporate marketplace. As one energy trader for Enron flatly
stated, "I did it because I was trying to maximize profits for Enron.' '5 In
case after case, corporate executives who would balk at stealing a candy
bar from a convenience store suddenly found themselves at the center of
a Ponzi scheme to defraud billions of dollars.
The recurrent pattern of a seemingly innocent person who loses his
moral compass when placed within a large business institution raises the
question of whether there is something structurally immoral about the
modern corporation.6 Recent books on the corporate scandals are neatly
divided on this question.7
On one side are a group of mostly left-leaning scholars and activists
who see the modern corporation as a destructive behemoth that needs to
be radically changed. As Professor Lawrence Mitchell writes in Corpo-
rate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export, "Corporate misbehavior
is not especially the fault of corporate managers, stockholders, and
employees. ... [I]t is the result we should expect from the legal structure
and rules we establish to create the corporation."8 As another scholar
puts it, "[C]orporate managers, for the most part, are like you and me,
except that they've spent a good part of their lives in the corporate sys-
tem. That system, and the particular way it keeps score, holds them
hostage." 9 It should be obvious from the titles of the books by Thom
Hartmann, l0 Marjorie Kelly,11 and Lawrence Mitchell' 2 that they see the
problem of corporate wrongdoing as related to the deep structure of cor-
porations as legal entities. This is sometimes referred to as the "anti-
5. Davis Lazarus, Energy Industry's Dirty Little Details About to See Light, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 20, 2002, at G1.
6. See, e.g., GERRY SPENCE, FROM FREEDOM TO SLAVERY 71 (1993) ("The corporate
structure may be a necessary evil to gather the capital required to carry on business, but the
corporate structure, itself, is inherently evil.").
7. See Kedric Francis, Piercing the Veil: Holding People Responsible for the Corporations
They Create, O.C. METRO, July 11, 2002, at 130 ("We all know something is very wrong in the
corporate world, though many disagree on the causes and the fix. Some blame a few bad apples
... [o]thers say the system is broken, inherently flawed."); see also David Wessel, Venal Sins:
Why the Bad Guys of the Boardroom Emerged en Masse, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2002, at Al ("One
view, a staple of speeches by chief executives and government officials, underscores that only a
small fraction of companies and executives stand accused of wrongdoing ... [b]ut there's another
view: The headline-making cases are symptoms of a broader disease, not exceptions, and a
regulatory apparatus that isn't up to the challenge.").
8. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT 97
(2001).
9. RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE
Do BAD THINGS 32 (1996).
10. THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND
THE THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002).
11. MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE
ARISTOCRACY (2001).
12. MITCHELL, supra note 8.
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corporation" position. 3 At bottom, this position holds that corporations
are inexorably driven to immoral conduct by the fundamental structure
of corporate law, or to put the point colloquially, "Corporations make
good people do bad things."' 4 Under this view, corporate scandals are
inevitable because the modem corporation has a structural imperative to
show a short-term profit even if this requires committing fraud and/or
shifting costs onto employees, the community, and the environment.
This notion of systemic rottenness looks beyond a few bad apples to an
underlying problem with the very nature of the corporation as a social
entity. Following the Enron debacle, members of the anti-corporation
camp insisted that we focus on the "systemic nature of the problem,"
proclaiming that "Enron executives were only doing what the system
suggested they had to do."' 5
On the other side of this debate is a collection of generally free-
market thinkers who argue that the scandals were caused by individuals
instead of entities. This was President Bush's stance when he came to
Wall Street and blamed the scandals on a few "bad apples"' 6 who need
to recover a "moral tone" of individual responsibility. 7 This position is
represented in a well-received new book on the history of corporations
by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, who celebrate the mod-
em corporation as a source of tremendous productivity, innovation, and
liberty.' 8 These thinkers are quick to point out that some of the worst
atrocities in the annals of business history were committed by non-cor-
porate entities. For example, the slave trade was conducted largely by
partnerships, the Robber Barons of the early twentieth century held their
interests in trusts, and the Western expropriation of the third world was
in full swing for centuries prior to the invention of the multinational
corporation. Not coincidently, the countries with the most corporations
are also the countries with the most civil liberties. And the widespread
ownership of stock by ordinary Americans heralds a new type of democ-
racy, as opposed a century ago when entire industries were owned by a
few families. Micklethwait and Wooldridge are inclined to see corpora-
13. See, e.g., John Cavanagh & Jerry Mander, Fixing the Rotten Corporate Barrel: States
Grant Corporate Charters; They Should Start Taking Some of Them Away, THE NATION, Dec. 23,
2002, at 22 ("Around the world, the spectrum of anticorporate activity is broad, with strategies
ranging from reformist to transformational to abolitionist.").
14. EsTEs, supra note 9.
15. Cavanagh & Mander, supra note 13, at 22.
16. See, e.g, Jeff Madrick, Bush Talking Tough on Corporate Ethics, but Where is the
Regulatory Bite?, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at C2.
17. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, President Thinks Conscience Helps as Much as Laws,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 10, 2002, at Al.
18. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003).
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tions, and the market more generally, as self-regulating mechanisms that
will root out chicanery for the simple reason that such behavior is not
profitable and sustainable in the long run. All stock markets go through
bubbles and scandals (dating back at least as far as Tulipmania in the
1630s) but sound business practices will always prevail and force inves-
tors to focus on fundamentals. The extreme version of this view can be
found in a statement of former Columbia University President Nicholas
Murray Butler: "The limited liability corporation is the greatest single
discovery of modem times."' 9 Under this view, the recent corporate
scandals are the product of simple greed (an ineradicable feature of the
human condition) combined with lax monitoring by investors hoping to
make a quick buck. Far from being structurally immoral, the modem
corporation has improved the lives of millions of people and is corre-
lated with advanced industrial societies where people are free, educated,
informed, and prosperous. This position does not have a name in the
popular literature, but for obvious reasons I will refer to it as the "corpo-
rate apologist" stance.
Which of the two views under consideration here, the anti-corpora-
tion position and the corporate apologist position, best characterizes the
corporate wrongdoing that has dominated the business pages in recent
years? Were the recent scandals rooted in the structure of corporate law,
or were they caused by basic human greed, something that has existed in
all societies since the beginning of time and which predates the modem
corporation?
In this Essay, I will argue that neither position is entirely satisfac-
tory. The corporate apologist stance is probably less useful in explain-
ing the current scandals because it focuses exclusively on individual
wrongdoing and thereby fails to give a larger account of why so many
scandals involved collective decision-making instead of rogue individu-
als. Chalking everything up to individual greed may explain why some
of the top executives committed fraudulent acts, but it doesn't explain
the involvement of countless boards of directors, middle-managers, con-
sultants, analysts, and supposedly neutral parties such as lawyers and
outside accounting firms. Surely there is something structural and sys-
temic that placed these otherwise law-abiding people in motion to per-
petuate the meltdown of our financial markets.
The anti-corporation position has the advantage of seeking a sys-
temic source for the scandals, but it runs aground by focusing too nar-
rowly on corporations per se. After all, there are reasons for doubting
that the corporate form, standing alone, is evil. Most of the authors
19. See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 21 at 43 (1917).
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under consideration here concede that there is nothing evil about mom-
and-pop corporations (which are, after all, corporations), and further-
more, many of the businesses involved in the "corporate" scandals were
not corporate entities at all, but rather partnerships and limited partner-
ships. The anti-corporation stance has little to offer by way of explain-
ing how these entities became active participants in fraudulent schemes.
In my opinion, we can best explain the recent scandals by looking
beyond individuals and beyond corporations to the pernicious effect of
large institutions staffed by desperate and pliant workers. All of the
recent scandals involved massive institutions, suggesting that size is cor-
related with wrongdoing. When a business attains a certain size, the
entity itself takes on a kind of transcendental force, converting everyone
into mere role players to serve the higher purposes of the institutional
empire. Massive size is also correlated with bureaucracy and an
advanced division of labor, which ensure that managers remain far
removed from the effects of their actions. All of the wrongdoing is
mediated through endless layers of agents and advisors, with the result
that no single person caused the problem and therefore no one individual
is responsible. Distance, submission, mediation, role morality - these
are not exclusively "corporate" phenomena; they can be found in other
business structures of comparable size (whether partnerships, limited
partnerships, or limited liability companies). Perhaps we need to look
even deeper to the underlying economic order which functions as a
breeding ground for corporate scandals. Viewed critically, our economy
generates a massive labor pool of eager soldiers willing to serve any
moneymaking institution, but who nevertheless lack the ability to recog-
nize or resist being drawn into massive, abstract frauds. We need to
broaden the discussion to include a consideration of institutions and
underlying economic structures.
I. THE "PERFECT STORM" THEORY OF THE MODERN CORPORATION
Recent books by Thom Hartmann, Marjorie Kelly, and Lawrence
Mitchell paint a "perfect storm" scenario beneath the current corporate
scandals. For these thinkers, a stream of disastrous legal developments
at the dawn of the twentieth century gave rise to the modern corporation
as a force for evil. These legal events include the following: the rise of
general incorporation statutes in the place of specific legislative charters
during the late nineteenth century; the removal of corporate charter
restrictions in the legislative "race to the bottom" during the early part of
the twentieth century; the recognition of corporate personhood by the
Supreme Court in the 1886 decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern
2004]
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Pacific Railroad Co. ;20 and judicial acceptance of the notion that corpo-
rations are merely profit-making machines whose sole purpose is to
maximize returns to investors. Taken together, these factors created the
modern corporation as a voracious, single-minded, opportunistic
Cyclops accountable only to greedy shareholders, possessing full rights
of personhood while lacking any offsetting social conscience.
All of these authors operate from the basic historical insight that
corporations played a minimal or nonexistent role for much of recorded
legal history, making an appearance only in situations where a large
enterprise was needed to accomplish a task too massive for smaller
firms, such as founding a university, building bridges and roads, or fund-
ing an exploration. Under English law, and then in the early years of
this country, a corporation could be established, otherwise referred to as
chartered, only through a special legislative act bringing the corporation
into existence. Further, such grants typically contained severe restric-
tions as to the corporation's capital structure, purpose, duration, manage-
ment, and ability to merge with other entities. Corporations were
limited to a specific public mission and could not be incorporated under
a general purpose clause, which is the norm nowadays, such as "the
corporation can pursue any and all lawful purposes."'" State legislatures
retained the ability to examine corporate books and to revoke or amend
charters, and, amazingly, shareholders did not always receive limited
liability for their investments.22
The requirement of obtaining a special legislative charter for each
corporation meant that well-connected persons had a distinct advantage
in getting a state legislature to approve a corporation. This proved
anathema to Jacksonian democracy, and it was ill-suited to a vibrant and
spontaneous economy where corporations needed to be chartered
quickly so that they could raise massive capital for giant projects such as
building railroads and telegraph lines. As a result of these pressures, the
process of special chartering was replaced with "general" corporate stat-
20. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2004) ("It shall be sufficient to state, either
alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any
lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation
Law of Delaware, and by such statement all lawful acts and activities shall be within the purposes
of the corporation, except for any express limitations, if any.").
22. These special charters can be found in any law library. See, e.g., An Act to Incorporate
the Geneva Manufacturing Company, 42 Laws of Ohio 6 (January 13, 1844) (establishing a limit
on capital stock of $25,000, a limited purpose of manufacturing cotton and wool, and specifically
providing that "[t]he stockholders shall be jointly and individually held liable for all the debts of
the corporation."). Nowadays, the same business could be incorporated in Ohio for a perpetual
duration, for any lawful purpose, with limited liability, with a capital limit of $25 million, all by
simply filling out a two-page form and submitting a fee to the Secretary of State.
[Vol. 58:811
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utes that permitted any group of persons to set up a corporation without
a legislative grant. This made corporations easier to form, but corporate
law still retained limits as to an entity's size, duration, and purpose. In
light of legal restrictions on corporations, the Robber Barons who came
to prominence at the turn of the twentieth century held their empires in
the form of trusts. z3 When the giant trusts were eventually dismantled as
an illegal restraint of trade, the Robber Barons turned to the corporate
form, enticed by states that had rewritten their general corporation laws
to eliminate restrictions. This created the infamous "race to the bottom"
where New Jersey, and then Delaware, began to strip away every signif-
icant restriction on corporations. Delaware ultimately became the pre-
ferred state of incorporation due to the permissiveness of its laws, a
distinction that it still holds.2 4
Once corporations were freed from restrictions as to purpose, size,
duration, and governance, they started to grow to unparalleled heights,
leading to a super-breed of multinational corporations.25 The rise of
giant corporations with millions of shares and the development of secon-
dary markets for those shares brought about a unique separation of own-
ership and control. Stockholders theoretically "owned" the corporation,
yet were so scattered and unorganized that they had virtually none of the
control that typically comes with ownership of property.26 For perhaps
the first time in history, it became common for persons to invest in an
enterprise and remain totally passive, leaving everything to managers
who tended to self-perpetuate through their manipulation of the proxy
machinery. This separation of ownership and control became the defin-
ing feature of the modern American corporation, giving rise to fears that
the economy would be held hostage by a class of complacent managers.
23. One such restriction on corporations was that it was forbidden for one corporation to own
stock in another corporation. HARRY HENN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 183 at
349 (1970) ("The general rule once was that a corporation could not purchase shares of another
corporation.").
24. See William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974) (recommending federally imposed minimum standards for state corporation
statutes to counteract the race to the bottom).
25. Recently, some activists have claimed that multinational corporations generate more
revenue than entire countries. For a critical take on this assertion, see MicKLETHWAIT &
WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 18, at 176.
26. The separation of ownership and control was first analyzed at length in ADOLPH A. BERLE
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). Their work
pointed out an agency problem with the modem corporation: How can directors represent
shareholders if they form a special managerial class whose interests lie in self-perpetuation? In
the last decade, this agency problem was thought to have been solved by aligning the interests of
management and stockholders by pegging executive compensation to an escalating stock price,
thereby creating a win-win situation for managers and stockholders. Unfortunately, this provided
a perverse incentive for executives to artificially inflate stock prices to trigger their compensation
packages.
2004]
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In this struggle between shareholders and executives, the people who
fare the worst are the so-called stakeholders, such as employees, credi-
tors, the community, and suppliers. Typically these entities and individ-
uals lack voting power because they do not own shares of the company.
Early in the history of the modem corporation, the judicial branch
sanctified the emerging model of the corporation as a profit-driven pri-
vate entity devoid of any public mission. In the famous case of Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co.,27 the court chastised Henry Ford for refusing to declare
a dividend from profits so that he could, instead, build a new plant that
would produce affordable cars for the common man. According to the
court:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of the directors is to be exer-
cised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to
a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondis-
tribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.28
This view would later reach an apex in Milton Friedman's claim that a
corporation's sole public responsibility is the maximization of profits,29
and in the now dominant "law and economics" notion that a corporation
is a mere "nexus of contracts" between individuals seeking private gain,
not a social entity with responsibilities to the community.3"
At the same time that corporations had fewer public responsibili-
ties, because they didn't need to perform a public service to receive a
charter and had no obligations to stakeholders, they were demanding
increased rights as public citizens. These rights included constitutional
rights on a par with "natural" persons. In a series of controversial deci-
sions beginning with the Santa Clara case in 1886, the Supreme Court
declared, without discussion, that corporations were legal "persons."'"
This way of thinking survives in the notion that corporations have rights
to free speech, privacy and due process. Yet, while corporations have
many of the rights of natural persons, they lack the complex human
27. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
28. Id. at 684.
29. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 17.
30. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 1416 (1989) (viewing corporate law as an off-the-rack contract, reducing the transaction
costs of separately negotiating every business point). But see STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE
LAW AND ECONOMICS 27-28 (2002) (claiming that the nexus of contracts model need not lead to
short-term maximization of profits, since this would overly benefit shareholders at the expense of
other contracting parties such as suppliers and creditors).
31. Santa Clara County v. So. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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emotions that restrain immoral conduct, such as family ties, vulnerabil-
ity, love, shame, and guilt. Indeed, in most major corporations there
seems to be a serious disconnect between the executive suite and the
shop floor: While earnings plummet and workers are laid off en masse,
executives reap massive compensation packages, typically four hundred
times that of an average worker.32
Given this history, Hartmann, Kelly, and Mitchell tend to view the
modem corporation as essentially sociopathic - something akin to a
super-rich and well-connected human being who is motivated solely by
return on investment and totally unmoved by attachments to family or
community, or by human vulnerability. This complex "person" can
divide itself into pieces, avoid taxes by moving its mailing address off-
shore, leave its hometown and lay off employees without shedding a
tear, and live forever. Calling a corporation a "person" gives rise to
bizarre situations such as a well-publicized recent case that came before
the Supreme Court involving the sports apparel-maker Nike, which
claimed the "right to lie" in press releases denying its ownership of over-
seas "sweatshops," under the theory that any false statements were pro-
tected as free speech under the First Amendment.33 More importantly,
the right of free speech allows corporations to become key players in the
political and regulatory process via campaign contributions. Enron, for
example, donated heavily to George W. Bush while he was governor of
Texas, his father before him, and a host of other politicians. Perhaps it
was no coincidence that Enron was exempted from the strictures of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act and from oversight by the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).34 As a profit-driven insti-
tution, the American corporation will, perhaps arguably must, make
political donations in a manner that assures a profitable bottom line,
which means "the corporate scandal is a political scandal."3
32. See, e.g., Douglas Feiden, No Losses for Biggest Bosses, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4,
2002, at 6 (noting that AT&T axed 10,000 jobs and lost nearly $7 billion in 2001, yet the chief
executive officer was awarded over $20 million; Lucent Technologies posted a $17 billion loss in
2001, yet the chairman was awarded a package in excess of $22 million).
33. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (dismissing the appeal on procedural grounds).
In the decision below, the California Supreme Court ruled against Nike, claiming that their denials
surrounding the "sweatshops" amounted to commercial speech with a lower threshold of
constitutional protection, meaning that any false statements by Nike about the "sweatshops" could
be actionable as false advertising. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
34. See, e.g., Jackie Spinner, Utility Act's Critics Point to Blackout, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
2003, at E4 (noting that Enron gained an exemption from the Public Utility Holding Company
Act); Robert Manor, Gramms Regulated Enron, Benefited from Ties, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 18, 2002, at
17 (noting that Wendy Gramm, later a director at Enron, was chair of the CFTC when it passed a
controversial set of rules exempting energy trading - Enron's specialty - from oversight by the
CFTC).
35. HUFRNOTON, supra note 1, at 236 (emphasis added).
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These, then, are the major themes of the anti-corporation move-
ment, and they are repeated again and again like an endless mantra in the
pronouncements from the anti-corporation side. Consider a typical proc-
lamation from an activist who was formerly a securities lawyer at the
renowned law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom:
The reason corporations are prone to violate the public interest is that
corporate law establishes the corporation solely for one purpose -
making money. Price gouging and externalizing costs serve this pur-
pose. They increase profits. Nothing in the corporate law balances
this requirement that the corporation pursue its own self-interest.
Corporations should have obligations to the public as well as to
shareholders. Corporations would not exist if state laws did not per-
mit them to be created and to operate. Those laws can be amended to
change the nature of the corporation so that it respects the public
interest instead of destroying it .... Corporations are institutions, not
people. They have no conscience, morals nor sense of right and
wrong. They have no sense of living in a community. They have
none of the human traits and characteristics that restrain people in
ways that laws cannot and make living in a community possible.
Although corporations act only through people, these people are
forced to play roles that in some ways make them more like machines
than human beings. Protecting the public good is not part of their job
description.36
Scholar and activist Noam Chomsky is even more direct in his disdain
for corporate law:
'The board of directors of a corporation actually has a legal obliga-
tion to be a monster,' an ethical monster. Their legal obligation is to
maximize profits for the shareholders, the stockholders. They're not
supposed to do nice things. If they are, it is probably illegal, unless
it's intended to mollify people, or improve market share, or some-
thing. That's the way it works. You don't expect corporations to be
benevolent any more than you expect dictatorships to be benevolent.
Maybe you can force them to be benevolent, but it's the tyrannical
structure that's the problem . . .3
For these thinkers, the modem corporation is a hugely powerful behe-
moth with massive amounts of capital and no obligation to pursue the
public interest. Further, these entities enjoy full rights to free speech and
36. Robert Hinkley, Neither Enron Nor Deregulation, published May 19, 2002, by
CommonDreams.org, at http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0519-07.htm (last visited Mar.
29, 2004).
37. Noam Chomsky, Taking Control of Our Lives: Freedom, Sovereignty, and Other
Endangered Species, Speech delivered to the Interhemispheric Resource Center in Santa Fe, New
Mexico (Feb. 26, 2000), paraphrasing the view held by economist Milton Friedman, supra note
29, transcribed at http://www.ratical.org/co-globalize/NC022600.html (emphasis in transcript)
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
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lobbying yet do not have the nagging burdens of being tied to a commu-
nity, a family, or a conscience. Finally, because the compensation of
managers is often tied to the company's stock price, managers have an
overwhelming personal and institutional incentive to maximize quarterly
returns to shareholders, a mandate that forces them to adopt fraudulent
schemes. What is even worse is that no one is willing to step forward
and place any limits on this situation. Shareholders are simply playing
the market in short-term speculation and would rather sell their stock
(the so-called "Wall Street option") than engage in a costly battle with
management to set the corporation on the right course. The directors are
not going to change things because they are in bed with management,
often preferring to rubber-stamp the CEO's conduct and simply resign
when a scandal breaks out. To make matters even more difficult, recent
legislation has placed nearly insurmountable procedural barriers in front
of shareholders who have the temerity to bring a lawsuit for securities
fraud.3 8 The result is a nightmare of short-term desperation and book-
keeping sorcery, where corporate insiders line their own pockets and
obsess over stock price while externalizing all social costs onto unwill-
ing and unknowing victims.
To their credit, the authors considered here are not content to
merely complain about corporate misconduct - they actually float
some fascinating proposals for reforming corporate law:
" A Constitutional amendment declaring that corporations are not
natural persons and not entitled to constitutional rights;39
" Granting states the power to revoke corporate charters based on
immoral conduct negatively impacting the community (e.g., mass
layoffs, pollution, plant relocation);" °
" Requiring corporations to let employees vote on parity with share-
holders and to serve on the board of directors;"1
" Requiring corporations to make environmental and social disclo-
38. See, e.g., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737, codified as 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1, 77u-4 (imposing restrictions on class-action litigation
alleging securities fraud). Most recently, the PSLRA was invoked by a federal judge to dismiss
securities fraud claims brought against executives at WorldCom, which lost a staggering $11
billion in what was perhaps the largest accounting scandal in United States history. WorldCom
Execs' Scienter Not Shown With Regard to Alleged Accounting Fraud, 72 U.S.L.W. 1093 (Aug.
19, 2003).
39. See Daniel Brannen, Commentary, in HARTMANN, supra note 10, at 315.
40. See KELLY, supra note 11, at 175. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has backed
this concept, claiming that when a corporation is convicted of repeated felonies or endangers the
public it should be "put to death, its corporate existence ended." See Cavanagh & Mander, supra
note 13, at 24.
41. KELLY, supra note 11, at 156.
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sures in addition to their financial disclosures;42
" Allowing directors to focus on the long-term health of the corpora-
tion by granting five-year terms for directors, and by issuing annual
earnings reports (instead of quarterly);43
" Requiring (rather than merely permitting) directors to take account
of so-called stakeholders in addition to stockholders; 44 and
" Amending the accounting rules and/or tax codes to reflect the con-
tributions of workers as an "asset" and to provide incentives for
socially responsible corporations."a
In addition to suggesting these reforms, each of the anti-corporation
books under consideration here zeroes in on a particular aspect of corpo-
rate law that the author finds particularly objectionable.
For example, Thom Hartmann directs most of his attention to the
problem of corporate personhood raised by the Santa Clara decision.46
Hartmann is convinced that the Supreme Court made a terrible mistake
in that case by failing to recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to grant equality and personhood only to freed slaves, not to
artificial "persons" such as corporations. Hartmann points out that
Santa Clara was the culmination of a lengthy effort by railroad lawyers
to avoid corporate taxation by asserting that the use of separate formulas
for individual and corporate taxation was discrimination against corpo-
rate "persons." Although Santa Clara is widely known as the key case
on corporate personhood, anyone who reads the case will see that the
actual decision turned entirely on the long-forgotten question of whether
a fence on a right-of-way was properly included in a corporate tax
assessment. The recognition of corporate personality is not contained in
the judges' opinions, but appears in a headnote inserted by the court
reporter, mysteriously referencing the Chief Justice's oral statement that
the Court did not want to hear argument on whether a corporation is a
"person" because the justices had already decided the matter in favor of
recognizing corporations as persons within the Fourteenth Amendment.
The text of the actual judicial opinion - the only part that is binding on
future courts - says nothing about corporate personhood. After consid-
erable research, Hartmann discovered that the mysterious headnote was
42. See EsTEs, supra note 9, at 210 (advocating a Corporate Accountability Commission to
mandate disclosure by public companies about how their practices affect stakeholders).
43. See MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 129, 161.
44. See KELLY, supra note 11, at 140.
45. See id. at 22; MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 246.
46. See HARTMANN, supra note 10, at 5 ("The real issue, rarely discussed but always present,
is whether corporations truly are persons in a democracy. Should they stand shoulder to shoulder
with you and me in the arena of rights, responsibilities, and the unique powers and equal
protections conferred upon humans by the founders and framers of the United States Constitution
and other democracies around the world that have used the United States as a model?") (emphasis
in original).
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inserted by a court reporter who was a lawyer of some distinction, hav-
ing longstanding ties to corporate and railroad interests. Hartmann
rightly points out that since headnotes are not law, and since the Court
never ruled on the personhood question in writing (and failed to cite any
authorities), Santa Clara never really stood for the proposition that cor-
porations are persons under the Fourteen Amendment. He also quotes
from Supreme Court Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas, who
were critical of Santa Clara, with Douglas proclaiming, "There was no
history, logic, or reason given to support that view."' 7 Hartmann's argu-
ments against the precedential value of the headnote are not particularly
new (as he acknowledges), but his fascinating expos6 of the court
reporter adds an important wrinkle to this controversy, raising fresh
doubts about the foundational case on corporate personhood. Still, sub-
sequent courts (including the Supreme Court) have recognized corporate
personhood, which means that corporate personhood has earned the
weight of precedent independent of the controversies surrounding Santa
Clara.
Hartmann proposes that corporations be stripped of personhood,
even going so far as to include an Appendix with a model municipal
ordinance for repeal of corporate personhood. According to Hartmann,
the danger of corporate personhood is that corporations have resources
outstripping ordinary persons, which means they are in a position to
assert their rights more vigorously, thereby influencing legislation and
public opinion while remaining unmoved by conscience and ties to the
community. Much of the book reads as a litany of corporate wrongdo-
ing from the days of the East India Company and the Boston Tea Party
to the latest trade talks under the World Trade Organization. Along the
way, Hartmann nicely draws attention to a long line of American politi-
cians and scholars who have expressed caution about the rise of corpora-
tions. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison cautioned against the
dangers of corporations, in part because the American colonies were
operated as corrupt English corporations. Later, Andrew Jackson
blocked incorporation of the Second National Bank. Abraham Lincoln,
once a lawyer for the railroads, was by the end of his life wondering
whether corporations would threaten democracy by overpowering indi-
vidual citizens. Within the last century, Presidents Woodrow Wilson
and Franklin Roosevelt denounced the tyranny of monopolies and the
concentration of capital in a few hands.
Hartmann's accounts of corporate malfeasance are moving and
heartfelt, but his focus on the evil of corporate personhood is undercut
by his historical descriptions of abuses that predate Santa Clara, and
47. Id. at 105.
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which cannot be blamed entirely on corporate personhood. Thus, while
Hartmann is doubtlessly correct that corporations have a long history of
abusive behavior, he has failed to put his finger directly on the source of
corporate wrongdoing. Undeterred by this inconsistency, Hartmann
insists that personhood is the foundation of corporate evil, and in an
exaggerated passage he claims that corporate personhood is responsible
for our "increasingly toxic environment, a fragile and top-heavy econ-
omy, and a hollow culture."48 This is the age-old Frankenstein story of
an inventor ruled by his creation - in this case, humans ruled by their
own social construction. According to Hartmann, the key is to invert the
hierarchy: "Only when corporations are again legally subordinate to
those who authorized them - humans, and the governments represent-
ing them - will true change be possible. To bring this about will
require a grassroots movement in communities all across America and
the world to undo corporate personhood, leading to change in the defini-
tion of the word 'person."' 4 9 Nonetheless, at the same time, Hartmann
admits that he has formed more than a dozen corporations himself, and
that "corporations do much good in the world."50 Therefore, he doesn't
advocate the complete overthrow of corporations (as do more extreme
social critics51) but a recognition that corporations are mere "agree-
ments" (social conventions) that do not deserve the benefits that we
bestow on natural persons. Yet Hartmann never clearly explains how
the abolition of corporate personhood would remedy all the corporate
evils he identifies. His analysis is further undercut by the concession
that most corporations have minimal capitalization, are governed infor-
mally by a few people, and don't commit much wrongdoing. His beef is
with large multinational corporations (and rightly so), but this leaves
open the question of whether the problem lies with personhood per se or
with personhood for large multinational companies. Hartmann is not
clear on whether personhood should be allowed for unincorporated busi-
ness entities such as associations, partnerships, limited liability compa-
nies, and so forth. One presumes that Hartmann would be aghast if a
hedge fund (structured as a limited partnership) were to engage in the
type of lobbying and power-mongering that he finds so offensive in the
hands of corporations. But if this is the case, then the real culprit is not
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 252 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 6.
51. See, e.g., DERRICK JENSEN, THE CULTURE OF MAKE BELIEVE 441 (2002) ("Corporations
are institutions created explicitly to separate humans from the effects of their actions, making
them, by definition, inhuman and inhumane. To the degree that we desire to live in a human and
humane world - and, really, to the degree that we wish to survive - corporations need to be
eliminated.").
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the corporation per se, but certain large-scale business institutions more
generally. By refusing to follow this logic to its conclusion, Hartmann
misses the deeper source of evil in the current corporate crisis.
Marjorie Kelly's recent book also contains an attack on corporate
personhood, but the brunt of her attack is reserved for "shareholder pri-
macy" - the imperative that managers maximize returns to sharehold-
ers even if this leads to pollution, layoffs, and accounting shenanigans:
After more than a decade of advocating corporate social responsibil-
ity and seeing its promise often thwarted, I've come to ask myself,
What is blocking change? The answer is now obvious to me. It's the
mandate to maximize returns for shareholders, which means serving
the interests of wealth before all other interests. It is a systemwide
mandate that cannot be overcome by individual companies. It is a
legal mandate with which voluntary change cannot compete.52
Kelly points out that the obsession with maximizing shareholder value
privileges owners (a small class of wealthy stockholders) at the expense
of non-owners (that is, stakeholders) - solely on the criterion of owner-
ship. This is played out in the differential treatment of shareholders and
employees: employees give their sweat and blood to the company, yet
they have no property claim on the wealth that they generate, and they
are treated as an expense that needs to be reduced as low as possible.
Shareholders, on the other hand, do not contribute fresh capital, but are
nevertheless rewarded with profits derived from the efforts of the work-
ers. This is the unfortunate feature of capitalism that so angered Marx
(who railed against the expropriation of "surplus value" - the wealth
that workers create beyond the funds necessary for their own suste-
nance).53 Kelly sees a fundamental defect in corporate law for the fail-
ure to give employees any property rights (or even representation on the
board of directors) while it rewards speculation by shareholders:
Corporate law says stockholders own everything the corporation now
has and everything it will create into the perpetual future. Hence the
increasing value of the corporation will flow forever to the sharehold-
ers, though they won't lift a finger to create that value. The presump-
tion is literally feudal.5 4
This "feudalism" is driven by the fact that a minuscule portion of Ameri-
cans actually own estimable stock holdings, which means that the corpo-
rations that run our lives serve the interests of a small class of investors.
52. See KELLY, supra note 11, at xii-xiii.
53. See, e.g., Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 700 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978) (explaining Marx's notion of surplus value, Engels
states that, "the appropriation of unpaid labour is the basis of the capitalist mode of production and
of the exploitation of the worker.").
54. KELLY, supra note 11, at 48 (emphasis added).
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Kelly finds shareholder primacy particularly galling since most share-
holders purchase shares in a secondary market (say, on the stock
exchange) and therefore do not supply any fresh capital to the corpora-
tion - they are akin to used-car buyers. In other words, giving special
status to shareholders over employees solely on the grounds that they are
investors instead of workers is tantamount to wealth discrimination.
Hence the subtitle of her book: Dethroning the Corporate Aristocracy
- in the place of an aristocracy based on hereditary lineage, we have
substituted an aristocracy based on the possession of wealth in the form
of corporate shares.
One drawback to Kelly's otherwise lucid analysis is her failure to
appreciate the value of secondary markets. The primary market is made
possible by the existence of a secondary market that allows liquidity for
the initial investors who would otherwise be stuck with the stock
received in an initial public offering. Without the "used-car" market for
stocks, there would be a much smaller primary market, impairing the
ability of firms to raise capital, and thereby leading to fewer innovative
products and services. Furthermore, Kelly doesn't realize that share
ownership need not be a passive activity of wealth-extraction; share-
holders can add value to the corporation by removing and replacing
directors, voting for mergers and fundamental changes, and amending
the corporate charter. Companies have a legitimate interest in keeping
the price of their shares high in the secondary market, because the com-
pany can then use its own shares as a resource for rewarding employees,
purchasing other companies via stock, impressing lenders, and garnering
name recognition.
Kelly chastises the modem corporation as the "brainchild of brutal
men in a brutal age, hell-bent of amassing for themselves untold wealth,
and leading a feudal revolt against the notion that corporations must
serve the public good."55 This feudalism can be reversed only with
increased democratization - especially by democratizing the corpora-
tion to give a voice to employees, the community, the environment, and
other stakeholders. Kelly calls for fundamental change in corporate law
by shifting the focus away from shareholders toward a more holistic
notion of the corporation as a public enterprise with an obligation to all
persons connected to it.56 This is all well and good, but one wonders
why the focus is always on the corporation as a species. There is noth-
ing especially aristocratic (that is, undemocratic) about the corporation
55. Id. at 142.
56. Kelly's argument has resonance with Blair and Stout's "team production" model of the
corporation. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (arguing that managers do not have a duty to maximize stock
price but rather to mediate the demands of competing stakeholders).
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that cannot also be said about the limited partnership, the limited liabil-
ity company, or the business trust, which suggests that (notwithstanding
her wonderful suggestions) Kelly hasn't quite put her finger on the ques-
tion of whether corporations are inherently evil. Like Hartmann, she
fails to explain why smaller corporations, having the same basic legal
structure, are not inherently evil as well. Her book is a wonderful intro-
duction to many of the anti-corporation positions on key issues, but it
doesn't address the larger question of wrongdoing across various busi-
ness structures.
Lawrence Mitchell, a highly respected professor of corporate law,
writes at a much higher level of sophistication than the other authors
under consideration here. Whereas Hartmann focuses on corporate per-
sonality and Kelly focuses on shareholder primacy, Mitchell sees the
problem of corporate irresponsibility as tied to what he calls "short-
termism" - the imperative to provide maximum return on investment in
the shortest possible time frame. As he explains:
Simply put, I will argue that the main problem with American corpo-
rations - the main cause of their irresponsibility - is their drive to
maximize short-term stock prices, a result that no thoughtful person
really wants. The root of the problem is the corporate structure itself:
the corporation's legal structure encourages mangers to aim exactly
for this short-term result, and it does so by constraining their freedom
to act responsibly and morally: the result is immoral behavior. 57
Yet Mitchell seems to flip-flop on his claim that the problem is struc-
tural. He says that maximization of shareholder profit "is not a legal
requirement ...[yet] arises from the legal structure of the American
corporation and the rules of corporate law."58 He says that "[t]he corpo-
ration's legal structure and rules result in the dictum to maximize share-
holder profit,"59 but concludes that "[t]he structure is not intrinsically
bad."6 In all likelihood he is asserting that short-termism is imbricated
in the existing structure of corporate law but isn't inherent in the concept
of the corporation itself. This means that there could be such a thing as
a responsible corporation, but not under the current legal framework.
Like Hartmann and Kelly, Mitchell points out how corporations
have veered from their original role as publicly chartered enterprises,
and he has harsh words for corporate personhood and limited liability,
both of which lead to the imposition of externalities on third parties.
Also like Kelly and Hartmann, he favors stakeholder laws to permit
directors to consider a corporation's impact on third parties. But unlike
57. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 3.
58. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 97.
60. Id. at 277.
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the other authors, Mitchell has the expertise to expose the vacuity of
corporate law from an internal perspective. Rather than simply railing
from a distance about corporate misconduct, he gets inside the legal doc-
trines and shows how the business judgment rule and the conflict-of-
interest provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Act fail to set
meaningful limits on directors, who remain powerfully insulated from
lawsuits no matter how outrageous their conduct. He also demonstrates
that shareholders face insurmountable difficulties when trying to reign in
executives via derivative lawsuits and proxy fights. After detailing these
structural flaws in Delaware law, Mitchell insists that corporations are
not inherently evil, and he insists that "the most important solution is not
legal; it is normative."6 Like classical economic thinkers, he believes
that the centralized management inherent in the corporate form is highly
efficient and socially productive - it merely needs to be tied to long-
term incentives.
Mitchell focuses almost exclusively on corporations, but one won-
ders if his comments extend to other business structures. At the begin-
ning of the book he asserts generally that the structural problems with
the modern corporation are tied to a more general bias toward liberalism
running through American law. According to Mitchell, our legal system
adopts a posture of radical individualism, where people are responsible
only for their own welfare instead of having a duty to rescue others.62
The modern corporation is the apex of this current - it is the ultimate
self-concerned "person" who exists to benefit its own bottom line and
disregards others. Mitchell says that this is made possible by the adop-
tion of role morality whereby the players within the corporation are
compelled to make decisions to feed this voracious beast's hunger for
profits, even if their decisions as role players within the corporation are
not the ones that they would personally approve in their everyday lives
outside the office. Mitchell's discussion of the underlying assumptions
of American law raise the possibility that the problems identified in Cor-
porate Irresponsibility are not solely corporate problems but are instead
part of a larger problem of institutions generally, a suggestion that I will
take up in the final section of this Essay.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH BLAMING CORPORATIONS
All of the anti-corporation books under consideration here end up
fudging the question of whether corporations are, as Gerry Spence says,
"inherently evil."6 3 There is at least one good reason for doubting this
61. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 30.
63. SPENCE, supra note 6.
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claim: If corporate law suffered from a systemic defect, we would
expect to find wrongdoing evenly distributed among various types of
corporations - from close corporations to publicly held corporations,
from "S" corporations to "C" corporations. But in fact the anti-corpora-
tion movement focuses exclusively on the wrongdoing of large, public,
often multinational corporations. Rarely is there a critique of mom-and-
pop corporations, which are numerically more common, such as the
neighborhood dry cleaners or the local grocer. This is a tacit admission
that corporate wrongdoing is not related to the structure of corporations
alone, but is instead correlated with the size of an entity and whether it is
publicly held. To put the matter differently, it is wrong to generalize
about the faulty structure of "corporations" while tacitly conceding that
most corporations do not generate immoral behavior. The endless focus
on large multinational corporations is a tacit admission that small corpo-
rations are not correlated with evil, thereby raising the possibility that
wrongdoing is more accurately tied to some factor other than corporate
status.
A second major reason for doubting the "inherent evil" argument is
the existence, perhaps somewhat rare, of corporate entities that are
socially conscious. This would not be possible if the corporate form
itself caused wrongdoing. Levi Strauss, Ben & Jerry's and The Body
Shop are often mentioned as companies that have tried, somewhat
unsuccessfully at times, to balance profits and social responsibility.6 In
addition, there are mutual funds and products that invest solely in
responsible businesses or donate a substantial portion of profits to good
causes, such as the Domini Social Responsibility Funds and the Work-
ing Assets Visa. These examples demonstrate that the corporate form,
standing alone, is not a barrier to socially responsible conduct. Indeed,
there is nothing to prevent a "for-profit" corporation from setting itself
up through charter and bylaw provisions to spend its profits on charity,
employees, or protecting the environment. In fact, the RTMark Corpo-
ration is a for-profit Delaware corporation that is set up to encourage
worker-based sabotage and guerilla tactics such as funding a project that
switched the voice boxes in G.I. Joe and Barbie dolls. 65 This is an
extreme example, but it suggests that corporations are largely empty
vessels nowadays; they are not inherently profit-seeking machines that
externalize all costs onto unwitting third parties. To be sure, some cor-
porations fit this description, but it is not corporate law that necessarily
64. The magazine Business Ethics has an annual list of the 100 best corporate citizens. See
BUSINESS ETHICS, Mar./Apr. 2002, available at http://www.business-ethics.conL/2002 100_best_
corporatescitizens.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
65. See Alissa Quart, Cultural Sabotage Waged in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2000, at
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propels them to that conduct. In the end, the problem with corporate law
is that it lacks fail-safe mechanisms forcing managers to place value on
non-economic factors such as the community, employees, and the envi-
ronment. Corporate law suffers from a flaw of omission, not commis-
sion. In some ways corporations can be seen as a progressive form of
business organization because corporate law allows investors to elect
and remove directors, bring derivative claims, approve organic changes,
demand appraisal rights, and force a dissolution of the business. In the-
ory, at least, the corporation is meant to function as a democracy held in
check by voting investors.
A final reason for questioning the charge of "inherent evil" is that a
lot of so-called "corporate" wrongdoing is being committed with the
active participation of non-corporate entities such as limited liability
companies, partnerships (general and limited), trusts, and other struc-
tures. As mentioned earlier, the Enron debacle involved a range of busi-
ness structures bound together in a massive fraudulent scheme.66 A
comprehensive account of the corporate scandals would need to explain
how these non-corporate entities could produce similar acts of destruc-
tion while lacking the requisite evil structure of corporations. After all,
the worst offenses in American business history have been committed by
trusts, not by corporations.67 All of this suggests that corporate law is
not solely to blame, but that wrongdoing is prevalent in any business
institution that takes the form of a gigantic bureaucratic monolith run by
a cadre of insiders who are disconnected with employees and consum-
ers, and where the pressure to generate revenue compels the adoption of
an instrumental rationality that overpowers individual conscience.
Many of these counterarguments to the anti-corporation camp can
be found in Micklethwait and Wooldridge's history of the company,68
which covers both the American corporation and the English joint-stock
company. Both authors write for The Economist magazine and
unabashedly proclaim that the modem corporation is a source of social
66. See MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
COLLAPSE OF ENRON 373 (2003) (showing the various types of corporate and unincorporated
entities involved in a single off-balance sheet deal).
67. Perhaps the most notorious labor battle in American history was the Homestead battle in
Pittsburgh where striking workers were murdered. The business structure in that instance was a
limited partnership controlled by Andrew Carnegie. See, e.g., LEON WOLFF, LOCKOUT: THE
STORY OF THE HOMESTEAD STRIKE 54-55 (1965). The cruelest business owner in English
literature may be Charles Dickens' Scrooge, who conducted business as the partnership "Scrooge
& Marley." See CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL IN PROSE 2 (1894). Some of the most
recent "corporate" scandals involve hedge funds organized as limited liability companies and
limited partnerships. See, e.g., SEC Officials Seek Trading Information Via Letters to Mutual
Funds, Intermediaries, 72 U.S.L.W. 2142 (Sept. 16, 2003).
68. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 18.
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progress. The corporate structure allows entrepreneurs to raise massive
amounts of capital for large projects and research agendas, thereby pro-
viding the widest range of new products and services.6 9 As they point
out, countries with many corporations tend to have citizens who enjoy
the broadest political freedoms.70 Further, the history of corporations is
becoming less brutal: "In general, companies have become more ethical:
more honest, more humane, more socially responsible."' I For Mickleth-
wait and Wooldridge, the corporate scandals cannot be traced to the cor-
porate form of business: "There was nothing particularly 'corporate'
about hiding debts in dodgy partnerships or spending $6,000 on a gold-
and-burgundy floral-patterned shower curtain - and then charging it to
the company that you ran (as the head of Tyco did)."7 2 Instead of join-
ing the chorus for greater corporate regulation, they caution against
overregulation and suggest that the market will self-regulate because
investors burned in the dot-com crash will soon insist that companies
show long-term fundamental strength. Micklethwait and Wooldridge
draw attention to the progressive side of corporations as vehicles for
democracy and equality. The concept of limited liability, for example,
tends to benefit lower income entrepreneurs who otherwise would not be
willing to stake their personal assets in a risky venture. Similarly, the
rise of employee stock ownership plans means that, for the first time in
history, workers can have a hand in electing their managers. Compared
to the private trusts and limited partnerships employed by the Robber
Barons, the modem corporation is highly transparent to public scrutiny
and infinitely more answerable to regulators. Furthermore, corporations
need not be locked into the short-termism decried by Mitchell and others
because that attitude is not sustainable - it drives away good employ-
ees and it destroys the element of trust necessary for any business to
thrive. In fact, nothing in corporate law literally requires a board of
directors to pursue profit maximization in the short-term. In any event,
short-termism is simply a trend that cannot be sustained over the long
haul, which means that the market will ultimately gravitate toward stable
companies that offer a reasonable (if not spectacular) rate of return.
All of this is useful as a corrective for some of the more extreme
claims of the anti-corporation position, but one gets the nagging feeling
69. Id.
70. Id. Nonetheless, Micklethwait and Wooldridge should not push this point too far, since
corporations played a big role in Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. In fact, Mussolini referred to
fascism as "corporatism" due to the connection between government and business. DENIS MACK
SMrrH, MussoLINI 271 (1982) (quoting Mussolini: "[T]he fascist state is corporative or it is
nothing."). Still, the basic point seems well-taken: corporations are generally a creature of the
West, where civil liberties have a longer tradition than in other parts of the world.
71. See id. MICKLETHWAr & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 18.
72. Id. at 156.
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that Micklethwait and Wooldridge are simply dodging the larger ques-
tion of systemic (structural) evil when they blame the corporate scandals
on greedy individuals. The problem with appealing to raw human greed
is that most of the wrongdoing in the recent scandals was filtered
through layers of employees, bankers, advisors, and consultants - most
of whom had little to gain from the fraudulent transactions, but were
simply "doing their jobs." The confessions of these people make clear
that they felt torn between their individual conscience and their corpo-
rate role. Prior to the Enron scandal, an insider confessed, "I know that
it would be devastating to all of us, but I wish we would get caught.
We're such a crooked company."73 This suggests that there is some-
thing systemic that channels, enables, justifies, and legitimates the fraud-
ulent schemes at the heart of the recent debacles. In what follows I
suggest that wrongdoing is related to institutions, particularly large
bureaucracies where managers spend all of their time exercising instru-
mental reasoning in furtherance of the institution's ready-made goals.
My intention is to shift the debate from the narrow issue of corporations
to the broader question of institutions and the underlying economic con-
ditions that fostered the scandals.
III. BROADENING THE Focus TO INSTITUTIONS AND
UNDERLYING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
If we look closely at the recent corporate scandals from the wider
perspective of institutions and background economic conditions, three
salient factors stand out. First, there is the question of size: All of the
institutions involved in the corporate scandals were large and imper-
sonal. Second, in each case there was a diffuse and untraceable causal
chain from the insiders' fraudulent acts to the disastrous effects on third
parties. Third, the institutions enjoyed tremendous prestige, power, and
authority in the eyes of their employees and the general public: The
institutions were staffed by minions who were desperate to stay afloat
and lacked the capacity to resist orders. When these factors align, the
stage is set for scandal.
On the question of size, it is no coincidence that the scandals
involved massive companies. When an institution reaches a certain crit-
ical mass, the lowly individual worker cannot peer around the curtain to
see fallible human beings pulling the strings - the institution begins to
loom large, as if it had a life and a force all its own. For example, if the
sole shareholder of a one-man corporation tells an employee to engage
in a questionable transaction for the greater good of the institution, the
73. SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 66, at 287.
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employee would probably laugh - after all, there is no "institution"
apart from the actual human being barking out orders. But things some-
how change when the institution in question is a multinational colossus
and the command is filtered through a series of middlemen. Suddenly
there is only a stark choice between obedience and losing your job. The
obvious decision is to keep your position and rationalize your conduct as
mandated by some mystical, invisible, and immortal entity - the "firm"
or the "company."
In The Grapes of Wrath, John Steinbeck gives an example of a
giant, faceless institution demanding obedience. In a famous scene,
henchmen from the bank tell a group of farmers that the decision to evict
them came from "the bank" and not from individual men:
"We're sorry. It's not us. It's the monster. The bank isn't like a
man."
"Yes, but the bank is only made of men."
"No, you're wrong there - quite wrong there. The bank is
something else than men. It happens that every man in a bank hates
what the bank does, and yet the bank does it. The bank is something
more than men, I tell you. It's the monster. Men made it, but they
can't control it."
.. The monster isn't men, but it can make men do what it
wants."74
A little later in the story, a farmer tries to stop the bank's tractor-
driver from razing his farmhouse by making him feel guilty for destroy-
ing another man's property, but the tractor-driver refuses to accept
responsibility:
"It's not me. There is nothing I can do. I'll lose my job if I
don't do it. And look - suppose you kill me? They'll just hang
you, but long before you're hung there'll be another guy on the trac-
tor, and he'll bump the house down. You're not killing the right
guy."
"That's so,' the tenant said. 'Who gave you orders? I'll go after
him. He's the one to kill."
"You're wrong. He got his orders from the bank. The bank told
him, 'Clear those people out or it's your job.'
"Well, there's a president of the bank. There's a board of direc-
tors. I'll fill up the magazine of the rifle and go into the bank."
The driver said, "Fellow was telling me the bank gets orders
from the East. The orders were, 'Make the land show profit or we'll
close you up.'"
74. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 45-46 (1939).
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"But where does it stop? Who can we shoot? I don't aim to
starve to death before I kill the man that's starving me."
"I don't know. Maybe there's nobody to shoot. Maybe the
thing isn't men at all. Maybe, like you said, the property's doing it.
Anyway I told you my orders."
"I got to figure," the tenant said. "We all got to figure. There's
some way to stop this. It's not like lightening or earthquakes. We've
got a bad thing made by men, and by God that's something we can
change." 75
There is a disturbing paradox here. The agents of the corporation
feel compelled to engage in morally objectionable conduct to serve the
corporation, yet the "corporation" doesn't really exist apart from its
agents. Authorities on agency law make clear that "[t]oday, most of the
world's work is performed by agents,"76 while at the same time "a cor-
porate body can only act by agents. 77 This creates a vicious circle of
endless agents trying to further the interests of an invisible principal.78
The whole process borders on idolatry, creating an artificial entity and
then claiming that the entity has commanded one to act in a certain way.
This would be humorous if it didn't lead to man-made disasters for
which no one is willing to assume responsibility.
In addition to the size factor, the recent scandals involved a diffuse
causal chain between the fraudulent acts and their ultimate effects on
third parties. When Professor Mitchell cites egregious examples of mis-
conduct in Corporate Irresponsibility79 (such as mass layoffs, clandes-
tine dumping of toxic waste, and automobile manufacturers designing
unsafe cars to save a few pennies), he suggests that such misconduct is
possible only because the corporate managers never have to face their
victims. In other words, their decisions are so heavily mediated that
they become disowned. In this way, a corporate insider can justify
cooking the books or burying hazardous waste as something that the
corporation is doing and that cannot be traced back to him personally.
Philosopher John Laches captured this wonderfully:
75. Id. at 51-52.
76. HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP 3 (2d ed. 1990).
77. 2 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 275 (penn. ed., rev. vol. 1998).
78. This was the situation parodied by Kafka in a short parable entitled Couriers:
They were offered the choice between becoming kings or the couriers of kings. The
way children would, they all wanted to be couriers. Therefore there are only
couriers who hurry about the world, shouting to each other - since there are no
kings - messages that have become meaningless. They would like to put an end to
this miserable life of theirs but they dare not because of their oaths of service.
FRANZ KAFKA, THE BASIC KAFKA 185 (1979).
79. MITCHELL, supra note 8.
[Vol. 58:811
ARE CORPORATIONS EVIL?
With the consequences out of view, people can be parties to the most
abhorrent acts without ever raising the question of their own role and
responsibility. Wage earners who insert the fuse in bombs can then
view their activity as but a series of repetitive motions performed for
a living. Railroad workers who take trainloads of prisoners to exter-
mination camps can think of themselves as simply providing trans-
portation.... It is no cop-out to think oneself blameless and condemn
society. It is the natural result of large-scale mediation which inevita-
bly leads to monstrous ignorance.8 °
In an economic system with an advanced division of labor, every project
is collective and no one is ultimately responsible. The executives
appointed by the board of directors claim to be driven by the need to
show a profit to the shareholders, the middle-managers are merely doing
what the executives tell them to do, the workers are merely following
orders from the middle-managers, and the lawyers and bankers are
merely giving professional advice while disclaiming responsibility for
their client's behavior. The collective nature of the project seduces indi-
viduals into a strange feeling of power without responsibility.8' In a
recent interview, a former trader at Enron explained that the sham trans-
actions were concocted in an isolated bubble inside Enron headquarters,
where analysts "worked late into the night massaging numbers" and
"flipping millions a day."82 When he was inside this bubble, the young
man thought to himself, "What's not to believe?"83 Only after he was
fired did he realize that his life at Enron "was about pumping hydrocar-
bons into the atmosphere and raping people on deals."84 As of this writ-
ing, a full two years after the Enron scandal was made public, none of
the central figures (including Chairman and CEO Kenneth Lay, CFO
Andrew Fastow, and President Jeffrey Skilling) has accepted a shred of
responsibility.85
80. JOHN LACHS, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN MODERN SOCIETY 13 (1981).
81. This was first noted by sociologist Gustav Le Bon: "The individual forming part of a
group acquires, solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which
allows him to yield to instincts which, had he been alone, he would perforce have kept under
restraint. He will be the less disposed to check himself, from the consideration that, a group being
anonymous and in consequence irresponsible, the sentiment of responsibility which always
controls individuals disappears entirely." Quoted in SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND
THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 6 (1959).
82. See Charles Bowden, Caught in the Dream of Enron, GENTLEMAN'S Q., June 2002, at
217, 219-220.
83. Id. at 220.
84. Id. at 221.
85. The group dynamic in all of the corporate scandals brings to mind the Cabaret joke from
Berlin in the 1930s: "'Show me one Nazi.' 'What do you mean? Here is a whole room full of
Nazis.' 'Yes, but show me one Nazi."' Nevitt Sanford & Craig Comstock, Sanctions for Evil, in
SANCTIONS FOR EvI.: SOURCES OF SOCIAL DESTRUCTIVENESS 1, 3 (Nevitt Sanford & Craig
Comstock eds., 1971). In other words, the recent scandals did not involve silent embezzlement by
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The nearest parallel to this suspension of individual conscience in
service of a vague institutional imperative can be found in times of war,
a point that can be seen when comparing the following quotes, the first
from an author commenting on the managers at A.H. Robins who mar-
keted the dangerous Dalkon Shield, and the second from George
Orwell's reflections during World War II:
The human being who would not harm you on an individual, face-to-
face basis, who is charitable, civic-minded, loving and devout, will
wound or kill you from behind the corporate veil.86
As I write, highly civilised human beings are flying overhead, trying
to kill me. They do not feel any enmity against me as an individual,
nor I against them. They are only "doing their duty," as the saying
goes. Most of them, I have no doubt, are kind-hearted law abiding
men who would never dream of committing murder in private life.87
In this light, the congressional hearings into the Enron and WorldCom
scandals were oddly reminiscent of the Nuremberg Trials, with the
defendants proclaiming that they were merely following orders and
doing their duty as good corporate soldiers.
Reporting on the trial of Nazi mastermind Adolph Eichmann, phi-
losopher Hannah Arendt proclaimed that Eichmann illustrated the
"banality of evil," the capacity of ordinary bureaucrats to participate in a
mass scheme of injustice and then blame the institution instead of
accepting personal responsibility.88 In modem institutions, whether cor-
porations like Enron or accounting firms like Arthur Andersen,
thousands of seemingly normal persons have restricted themselves to
instrumental rationality and cannot see beyond the immediate intra-firm
consequences of their actions. Arendt's term "banal" seems appropriate
here, since the executives accused of wrongdoing tend to be conserva-
tive upper-middle class white males, a group that is hardly ever consid-
ered a threat to society. Arendt's thesis about the banality of evil
remains controversial because most people prefer to see immorality as a
breakdown in individual psychology,89 but Arendt makes the more
a single disaffected employee, but collective action by corporate insiders acting together with
attorneys, consultants, and financial institutions.
86. MORTON MINTz, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD
(1985).
87. George Orwell, England Your England, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 257 (1954).
88. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1964). Despite his role in the mass deportation and extermination of Jews in Nazi Germany,
Eichmann insisted that, "I sat at my desk and did my work." Quoted in PETER PAPADATOS, THE
EICHMANN TRIAL 29 (1964).
89. See T.W. ADORNO ET AL, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 1 (Max Horkheimer ed.,
1950) (focusing on the "potentially fascistic individual, one whose structure is such as to render
him particularly susceptible to anti-democratic propaganda"). By contrast, the Israeli psychiatrist
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troubling suggestion that cruelty is systemic, that certain types of social
arrangements and institutions drive ordinary people into monstrous
crimes. People are easily drawn into immoral systems because they are
asked to perform only a narrow function within the system: each act,
considered alone, does not cause an immediate harm. In the Enron case,
a single fraudulent transaction was the joint product of hundreds of
executives, consultants, lawyers, and accountants - each performing a
rather innocent part of the whole (setting up a corporation, rendering tax
advice, making a few stock trades), yet the cumulative effect was to
defraud investors, bankrupt the company, rock the financial markets, and
destroy thousands of people's lives. The key factors here are distance
and mediation. Just as it is easier to kill someone by pushing a button
than in hand-to-hand combat, it is easier to defraud consumers and
investors, devastate a community, or dump pollution by approving a
business plan in a boardroom. Whereas a small business owner with a
handful of employees has to come face-to-face with the specific individ-
uals whom he lays off, the CEO of a large company can fire thousands
of people with a single email message, then hire security guards to clear
the discarded workers out of the building.
This depiction of innocent men bandied about by economic forces
seems to resonate in real-world accounts of disastrous corporate blun-
ders. Consider the Corvair, a General Motors car that was produced and
marketed to the public despite evidence that it was unsafe (several GM
managers had family members or friends who were injured in Corvairs).
A memoir of the debacle by former executive John De Lorean makes
clear that the system overpowered the individuals:
There wasn't a man in top GM management who had anything to do
with the Corvair who would purposely build a car that he knew
would hurt or kill people. But, as part of the management team push-
ing for increased sales and profits, each gave his approval to deci-
sions which produced the car in the face of serious doubts that were
raised about its safety. ... The system has a different morality as a
group than the people do as individuals .... Morality has to do with
people. If an action is viewed primarily from the perspective of its
effect on people, it is put into the moral realm. Business in America,
however, is impersonal.9°
The behavior of these men was eminently rational in the sense of follow-
ing a business calculus, quantifying the various options, arranging for
assigned to examine Adolf Eichmann reportedly stated that, "This man is entirely normal... more
normal than I feel myself after this examination." Quoted in PAPADATOS, supra note 88, at 28.
90. John De Lorean & J. Patrick Wright, How Moral Men Make Immoral Decisions - A
Look inside GM, in THE BIG BusINEss READER 36, 38-43 (Mark Green & Robert Massie, Jr. eds.,
1980).
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production and marketing, and performing other tasks necessary to bring
the car to market. These were successful, ambitious, clear-eyed, respect-
able, well-dressed men who lived in the suburbs, raised kids, went to
church, served on the PTA, and so forth, yet they were collectively
involved in producing a death machine.
The notion of willing "agents" who do what they are told within a
large institution brings to mind the work of Stanley Milgram, who con-
ducted experiments on authority at Yale University in the early 1960s.
Milgram brought in people off the street to participate in experiments
where they were asked to administer electric shocks to innocent victims
as part of an experiment on learning (the shocks were fake; the victims
were actors). 91 In the standard version of the experiment, the person off
the street was asked to be a "teacher" who administered a series of
increasingly powerful shocks to a "learner" under the direction of an
"experimenter" in an official-looking lab coat. For each wrong answer,
the "teacher" would give an increasingly strong electric shock to the
"learner" by flipping a switch on an apparatus connected to electrodes
strapped to the "learner." Milgram purposely designed the experiment
so that the victim gave consistently wrong answers, thereby presenting
the "teacher" with the option of giving increasing shocks or breaking off
the experiment. When the "teacher" showed signs of hesitation at the
severity of the shocks (and the resulting screams and protestations), the
experimenter would prod the teacher by saying things like, "Please con-
tinue ... The experiment requires that you continue ... You have no
other choice, you must go on." 92 Milgram found that an amazing per-
centage of ordinary Americans from all walks of life administered the
shocks with increasing voltages, even to the point of inflicting scream-
ing pain and heart attacks. Interestingly, Milgram found that people
were loath to administer the shocks if the experiment was slightly modi-
fied to require holding the subject's hand onto the "electric" device; they
found it much easier to administer shocks from behind a partition, and it
was easiest of all when the teacher performed a subsidiary action that
caused another person to actually flip the switch.93 Milgram's conclu-
sion from this variation of the experiment is especially chilling:
Any competent manager of a destructive bureaucratic system can
arrange his personnel so that only the most callous and obtuse are
directly involved in violence. The greater part of the personnel can
91. STANELY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974).
92. Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).
93. Milgram pointed out that diffusion of the causal chain within the experiment seemed to
approximate the conditions of modem society: "Thus there is a fragmentation of the total human
act; no one man decides to carry out the evil act and is confronted with its consequences. The
person who assumes full responsibility for the act has evaporated." Id. at 11.
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consist of men and women who, by virtue of their distance from the
actual acts of brutality, will feel little strain in their performance of
supportive functions. They will feel doubly absolved from responsi-
bility. First, legitimate authority has given full warrant for their
actions. Second, they have not themselves committed brutal physical
acts.9 4
In other words, cruelty is inversely correlated with proximity to the
victim.9
According to Milgram, the key to the subjects' behavior is that they
were placed in an "agentic state," i.e., converted into the agents of some
larger institution such as "Yale University" or, more abstractly,
"Advancement of Science." As long as the individual perceives the
authority to be legitimate, she focuses only on the immediate task at
hand and invests all of her shame and pride in how well she performs the
narrow task, regardless of the larger consequences of the entire project.
In the same way, the engineers who designed mobile gas chambers for
the Nazis showed little remorse over the murder of innocents and spent
most of their time apologizing for the inefficiencies of their designs. 96
To Milgram's credit, he saw that this occurs in every situation where
authority is perceived as legitimate and the causal chain is diffuse, a
situation found in every large business institution - banks, corpora-
tions, funds, law firms, brokerage houses, and accounting firms.
Had Milgram studied law, he would have realized that the "agentic
state" has a strong resonance in corporate law because agency is the cell
form of business organization. A sole proprietor operates through
agents, partners are deemed agents for each other, and corporations can
act only through their agents. Viewed in this light, Milgram's work
deserves attention from legal scholars because it suggests that the recent
corporate scandals are part of a larger problem of agency within total-
izing institutions (whether in corporate form or not) that tap into the
hidden fascism in all of us. This is not solely a corporate problem,97
94. Id. at 122.
95. See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 155 (1989) ("It is difficult to
harm a person we touch. It is somewhat easier to afflict pain upon a person we only see at a
distance. It is still easier in the case of a person we only hear. It is quite easy to be cruel toward a
person we neither hear nor see."). See also Andrew Kimbrell, Confronting Evil, TIKKUN
MAGAZINE, Nov./Dec. 2001, available at 2001 WL 10587414, at *5 ("I have been in many
corporate law firms and boardrooms and have yet to see any 'high fives' or hear shouts of
satisfaction at the deaths, injuries, or crimes against nature that these organizations cause. But that
of course simply underscores the problem; the corporation is fully distanced in time and space
from its actions.").
96. BAUMAN, supra note 95, at 195.
97. See JENSEN, supra note 5 1, at 442 ("Corporations don't cause destruction; they are tools
to facilitate it, legalize it, rationalize it, make it respectable."). It is worth remembering that acts of
institutionalized, impersonal evil can be found outside the corporate context (for example, in the
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and therefore it cannot be wholly solved with increased corporate regu-
lations of the type enacted in the wake of the corporate scandals.98 The
real evil lies in institutions of a certain size that can dwarf the individual
and reduce him to an agentic state of submission while distancing him
from the effects of his actions.
The final factor at work in the recent scandals is the involvement of
mid-level enablers who are seduced by the power and prestige of large
moneymaking institutions. Typically these enablers are young people
who lack the power to resist orders. Consider the story of a young trader
at Enron who is described as "straight, hardworking, ambitious,
polite"99 :
He doesn't even understand some of the numbers. But, then, how
could he? He's only been on the job a short while. He'll fake it;
he'll win. He tells himself, I'm a young kid, two years out of college.
I'm living inside the only thing I understand, the model, that's how
business is done.... Here is how it often works: you are never asked
to commit a crime; you are asked to make the model pay out. You are
never asked to lie; you are asked to structure. Your work eighty to
ninety hours a week, you never rest, you have no life beyond your
models. You produce. What's not to believe? You are in the hottest
company in the universe, whatever the hell it is really about.'00
Here we reach the deepest cause of corporate wrongdoing, namely that
our economy is built upon a massive labor pool of desperate people who
lack the educational and financial wherewithal to refuse orders in the
workplace. These people are thrown into a brutal and competitive
search for work, with a desperate need to make money to service the
massive debt loads that most young people are carrying. They struggle
to find work and spend their days haunted by the fear of losing a job that
was so hard to get in the first place. We are talking about millions of
passive and unreflective people who have absorbed the overriding cul-
tural message that success is ultimately measured in dollars and cents.
They constitute what social critic Pierre Bourdieu called a "reserve army
of employees rendered docile."' 1
military) and even in non-capitalist systems such as Communist Russia and China, where
otherwise law-abiding people participated in mass crimes in the name of obedience to the State.
98. For example, nothing in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act forces executives to come face-to-face
with the victims of corporate fraud and immorality. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7201-7266 (2002) (establishing a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee the
audits of public companies, requiring executives to certify financial reports, and mandating the
adoption of ethical codes by public companies).
99. See Bowden, supra note 82, at 217, 220.
100. Id.
101. Pierre Bourdieu, Neoliberalism, The Utopia (Becoming a Reality) of Unlimited
Exploitation, in AcTs OF REsISTANCE: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET 94 (Richard Nice
trans. 1999).
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This reserve army exists at all levels of the hierarchy, even at the
higher levels, especially among managers. The ultimate foundation of
the entire economic order placed under the sign of freedom is in
effect the structural violence of unemployment, of the insecurity of
job tenure and the menace of layoff that it implies. 10 2
In other words, our precarious economy creates workers who are ripe for
assuming what Milgram called the "agentic state" of blind obedience to
any authority perceived as legitimate. 103 It goes without saying that any
large institution oriented toward money-making (corporations, invest-
ment banks, law firms, and so forth) are considered de facto legitimate
precisely because they make money." This adds up to a frightening
picture: Most people in this country are easily recruited into large busi-
ness institutions where they will happily assume a small role within a
larger causal chain whose end result is massive fraud and illegality.
The books under consideration here raise the important question of
whether we should view the recent corporate scandals through the lens
of individual greed or by questioning the legal structure of the American
corporation. However, if I am correct, we must look even deeper. At
some point, we must come to grips with an underlying economic and
cultural system that effortlessly transforms ordinary people into agents
of destruction when they step inside large business institutions.
102. Id. at 98.
103. See Maury Silver & Daniel Geller, On The Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and
Individual Action, 34 J. Soc. ISSUES 125, 131 (1978) ("The fragmentation of action and the need
for job security explain the ease with which individuals will accept almost any organizational
legitimation."). One presumes that the converse of this formulation is equally true, that is, people
who have job security (and a social safety net) are less likely to obey orders blindly.
104. Marx recognized how money fosters the veneer of legitimacy: "Money is the supreme
good, therefore its possessor is good. Money, besides, saves me the trouble of being dishonest: I
am therefore presumed honest. I am brainless, but money is the real brain of all things and how
then should its possessor be brainless?" Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of
1844, in 3 KARL MARX - FREDERICK ENGELS COLLECTED WORKS 324 (1975).
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